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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Amid rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Asean has to tread carefully

  • Frayed cross-strait ties and the gulf between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan present hurdles in Asean’s attempt to play a constructive role in promoting dialogue
  • Unlike major powers like the US, the grouping is more reluctant to upset its big neighbour and largest trade partner
The election of William Lai Ching-te as Taipei’s leader portends turbulence across the Taiwan Strait. For Southeast Asia, the hotspot is now more dangerous, given the actors involved and the importance they attach to the issue, the dearth of formal dialogue between the direct parties, Beijing’s non-disavowal of the use of force and the deadlines floated for unification.
The Taiwan Strait is connected to the South China Sea, another regional hotspot where both Beijing and Taipei, along with four Southeast Asian states, lay claim to disputed areas. Unlike major powers like the US, Asean has a less elastic one-China policy; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is more reluctant to upset its big neighbour and largest trade partner.

Frayed cross-strait ties and the gulf between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan present hurdles in Asean’s attempt to play a constructive role in promoting dialogue.

Asean is wary about the storm brewing across the strait. Taiwan’s position in the global chip industry means a blockade would disrupt supply chains. Outright war could create a humanitarian disaster and an exodus of refugees to Japan and the Philippines, which are closest to Taiwan. Over 700,000 Southeast Asians live and work in Taiwan, comprising 80 per cent of foreign residents on the island.
Anticipating ripples ahead of the August 2022 visit of former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei, Asean foreign ministers issued a statement expressing concern and calling for “maximum restraint”. Last year, the Philippines and Indonesia said they were drafting contingency plans to evacuate their nationals should the need arise.
Situated next to the cauldron and given its long-standing alliance with the United States – Taipei’s main security backer – the Philippines is in a precarious position. When Beijing launched live-fire drills after Pelosi’s trip, they included the waters and airspace around Manila’s northern exclusive economic zone. This may have influenced the country’s decision to upgrade its treaty alliance with Washington and grant America expanded military access, including in three sites in northern Luzon across from Taiwan.
Beijing has made no secret of its view of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which won a historic third election. The same goes for Lai. It rebuked Singapore and the Philippines for sending congratulatory messages to the new Taiwan leadership. Given the climate, Beijing is sensitive to such expressions – whether official government releases or the personal social media tweets of foreign leaders.

04:31

Vice-President William Lai wins Taiwan presidential election as his party loses legislature majority

Vice-President William Lai wins Taiwan presidential election as his party loses legislature majority
To send a message to the new government in Taipei, Beijing may well introduce sanctions, more frequent and complex military drills, discard the median line that serves as the informal boundary between the two sides of the strait, or further limit Taiwan’s international space. Nauru’s severing of official ties with Taipei after the election may be a harbinger of more to come.
Beijing will come down hard on regional countries that show solidarity with Taiwan and may demand strict adherence to the one-China principle, becoming more critical of parliamentary and private visits of current and former officials.
Efforts to forge formal economic ties with Taipei through free-trade agreements or support for Taiwan’s inclusion in economic arrangements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework may elicit stronger opposition.
To counter this, Taiwan could dangle semiconductor investments, greater migrant labour intake, and technical and agricultural aid to regional countries. Asean is integral to Taipei’s New Southbound Policy, which aims to diminish its reliance on the mainland.

10:34

What Taiwan’s presidential election will mean for China, the US and the world

What Taiwan’s presidential election will mean for China, the US and the world

Regional countries wishing to climb the value chain will be eager to see Taiwanese capital, especially in chip manufacturing. Taiwan may ride on this to expand commercial and people-to-people ties with Southeast Asia to deepen its footprint in a crucial neighbourhood. As its formal diplomatic allies dwindle, Taipei is likely to invest more in the quality of relations it maintains.

More talk of a Taiwan contingency may lead to added US pressure on regional allies like the Philippines for greater access to host troops and supplies. The view is that the hardening of the US deployed presence and allied support could discourage Beijing from using force, coercion or intimidation to change the status quo across the strait.

Beijing, on the other hand, will see such steps as interference in its internal affairs, as sending the wrong signals to pro-independence groups in Taiwan, and as regional states signing up to US efforts to prevent reunification and national rejuvenation.

03:50

Mainland China white paper declares ‘greatest sincerity’ for peaceful reunification with Taiwan

Mainland China white paper declares ‘greatest sincerity’ for peaceful reunification with Taiwan

Some Filipino leaders have voiced fears over the country getting entangled in a cross-strait conflict, with US access to sites in northern Luzon becoming possible fair targets for mainland Chinese retaliatory fire.

Beijing is turning up the heat on Manila, the most vulnerable link in America’s “first island chain”. The spate of sea incidents, from the Chinese use of lasers on the Philippine coastguard to ship collisions in the South China Sea, is instructive. Some in Asean may have mixed opinions about Manila’s decision to invite more US and allied presence as this raises the spectre of closer encounters between US and Chinese assets in contested spaces like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Asean is expected to raise grave concerns about potential miscalculations.
For all its flaws, Asean may seek to play a meaningful role in promoting cross-strait dialogue and can draw on members’ experience. Singapore hosted the first summit between leaders of both sides of the strait in 2015. The city state and Vietnam also hosted meetings between the US and North Korea. Laos, this year’s Asean chair, will need the support of all members if the bloc wants to have a say on the worrying situation.

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation

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