Second guessing
As numerous international actors struggle to find a resolution to the growing standoff with Iran over its nuclear ambitions, increasing efforts are being made to discover one vital thing - the Islamic republic's actual intentions.
Discerning Iran's precise nuclear policy has become a matter of paramount importance, not just for Israel and the United States, but for China, Russia, the European Union, the UN and Nato. If Tehran will stop at nothing to develop a nuclear bomb, then a major international crisis looms; if not, then tensions could lower surprisingly quickly.
Penetrating the murky world of Iranian national decision-making and definitively identifying the regime's intentions are, however, notoriously difficult, and this poses significant challenges to these international players.
Rather than being a single-minded, cohesive regime, Iran's diverse leadership is regularly divided over key policies. Some figures seek self-imposed isolation, others advocate challenging the US, moderate Sunni Arab regimes and Israel. Still others advocate more pragmatic engagement with the west.
Yet, who falls into which camp does not fit western stereotypes - some of the isolationists, as well as some 'moderates', are among those who advocate developing a nuclear bomb, while some clerics have publicly stated that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's dogmatic stance on the issue is harming Iranian interests.
Mr Ahmadinejad, seen in the west as totally in tune with the state's hugely influential militant ayatollahs, has in fact annoyed leading clerics with his aggressive public pronouncements and for social reforms similar to those introduced by previous, reformist-orientated presidents.
There is also little to suggest, contrary to widely held assumptions, that Iran has an apocalyptic agenda. While there is little doubt, for example, that over the long term Tehran seeks Israel's dissolution or destruction, as a sovereign state it is interested in continuing to exist and strengthening its regional and global standing. Thus, it has no interest in a nuclear conflict that would certainly result in its destruction, too.
Iran's express interest is in forging a reality in which it can help defeat Israel, the US and other adversaries while also thriving and growing.
Being a nuclear state would help Iran achieve key aims vis-a-vis the US - removing it from the 'regime change' paradigm, and thus ensuring that it would never have to be subject to what the US and its allies did to Iraq in 2003.
Nuclear weapons could play a huge role in achieving long-term policy objectives; Iran would be free to initiate or support ever-increasing levels of conventional warfare against Israel, knowing that its enemy could not respond with a nuclear strike. Its partners, Hezbollah and Hamas, could be 'let off the leash'.
The burden of responsibility to end the crisis rests with Iran. Many in the international community are convinced that Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons; if this is not the case, Tehran must take substantive action to counter this perception.
There is little, however, to suggest that Iran has grasped this reality yet. Last week, it missed a deadline to reply to an international incentives package offered in exchange for an end to uranium enrichment. The political crisis in Israel and the US leadership void have emboldened Iran; Tehran is now convinced that the pressure is on its enemies rather than itself.
Assessments that Israel and the US are 'itching for a fight' are off the mark. However, the reality is that if they - and other key actors like the EU and Nato - continue to be unsure of Iran's intentions, they may feel forced to be more proactive and decisive. Should Iran remain obtuse and elusive, it risks a 'shoot first, ask questions later' response from these international players. That is a most dangerous game indeed.
Hagai Segal, a terrorism and Middle East specialist, lectures at New York University in London
