China's global footprint is part of its plan to become the heartland of Asia
Sonny Lo says this geopolitical strategy directs its foreign relations and development projects
China under Xi Jinping has adopted a so-called "heartland" geopolitical strategy not only to counter outsiders' perception of a "China threat" but also to project an image of a peaceful, self-confident and assertive nation.
When geographer Halford MacKinder wrote in 1904 that China was subject to foreign invasion and that the "heartland of the world" was centred on a huge part of the Eurasian region, mostly covering Russia, the Qing dynasty was so weak that it did not even have a geopolitical strategy.
Now, 110 years later, China is crafting its own borders to constitute the "heartland of Asia" - if not the world - a strategic position it will staunchly defend.
Xi will protect the Chinese heartland with hard power, by consolidating the strength and capability of the military, while utilising soft power through the spread of Chinese values and culture in surrounding regions.
With the establishment of the National Security Commission, Beijing sees its borderland regions, including most notably Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, as having geostrategic importance. Hence, it will not tolerate any separatist sentiment.
This explains the straightforward Chinese position towards Hong Kong's umbrella movement: another "colour revolution" providing a Trojan Horse for foreign countries to influence not just Hong Kong's political system but also the mainland in the long run.
Beijing is keen to avoid becoming another Soviet Union, which collapsed in part due to ethnic nationalism. Instead, it remains rigid in seeking to maintain a Han-dominated state in which multi-ethnic nationalities are accommodated with some degree of autonomy.
To safeguard the Chinese heartland, Beijing has been cultivating good neighbourly relations with Moscow, and the Central Asian and Southeast Asian states, to tackle terrorist and separatist threats. Furthermore, engagement with Southeast Asian states encompasses trade and security issues. This involves projecting an image of a peaceful and modern China.
Territorial disputes can also be put aside, as in the rapprochement with Japan during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing, in the interest of multilateralism and regional peace and prosperity.
Xi's meeting with Shinzo Abe was significant in two crucial aspects: China is willing to re-establish good relations with Japan on the condition that Tokyo admits at least the contentious nature of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; and Beijing is prepared to deal with any US-Japan alliance with self-confidence and assertiveness, with no concession to its territorial integrity.
China is engaging a comprehensive continental strategy supported by a clear vision for infrastructure development. Beijing has announced its ambition for a new Silk Road stretching from Xinjiang to Europe through the railway networks in Central Asia, and from Yunnan to Southeast Asian states. The silk "road" also includes maritime routes connecting northern China to Europe.
If China is to be the heartland of Asia, it has to be strategically connected to all parts of the world through railway networks, infrastructure projects and trade routes. This new geopolitical thinking shapes China's strategic outreach to Africa, where many nations have received economic aid and technological transfers.
Critics who say Beijing is adopting a "neo-imperialist" strategy that extracts energy from African states have ignored the larger context of its continental outreach.
The objectives are to export the Chinese model of economic development to Africa, win more friends in all parts of the world, and project an image of a peaceful and self-confident China.
Similarly, Beijing is willing to engage with Washington in all aspects, including climate change, trade and democratisation in Hong Kong. Xi told Obama that China does not want any external influence in Hong Kong's democratic development.
The message is clear: Hong Kong's democratic change has to be "Chinese" in style, and it cannot be used by any foreign power to promote political change on Chinese soil.
At the same time, Beijing is trying hard to win the hearts and minds of overseas Chinese. The Chinese diaspora is politically and economically significant; they can be a powerful lobby sector shaping foreign countries' policies towards China, and they can also help drive foreign direct investment back into China.
What MacKinder could not have foreseen in 1904 was that China's rapid economic rise would produce a self-confident and assertive country free from foreign invasion.
China's new geopolitical strategy has not been understood by its critics. In fact, Xi and his foreign policy team are eager to show a China that can contribute to world peace in the coming decades.
