Veto of 2017 political reform will bolster Leung Chun-ying's hold on power
David Zweig warns that voting down political reform for 2017 would probably result in a second term for Leung, who has emerged asthe biggest winner from the Occupy movement
Last spring, as we contemplated possible outcomes of the pending political events, including a potential occupation of central Hong Kong, one scenario circulating was that Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying might benefit from a potential political crisis. The events surrounding last week's policy address, including Leung's recent visit to Beijing, and the tone of the address itself, show that the big winner of Occupy Central was Leung himself.
Last summer, and particularly in the early days of Occupy Central, especially after the police used tear gas, Leung's job, and his political future, were hanging by a thread. Those who felt he might survive the week - because Beijing did not want to concede to political pressure on issues of personnel - were nevertheless convinced he would retire soon after the Legislative Council vote on political reform.
Now, in retrospect, he might be Beijing's hero. He has led Hong Kong through a very tough crisis and, with patience and excellent work by the police, he won the day for the central government. The leaders of Occupy Central are being called in and some may spend time in jail for breaking the law. Even the tone in which he presented his points - black and white, movement forward or movement back, no middle ground - and the swagger with which he presented his tough political line, all reflected a confident man who knows that he has the political support of the leadership in Beijing backing him up.
In his policy address, he certainly did not sound like someone who felt politically threatened. Rather, he sounded like someone who was threatening the democratic camp by telling them to smarten up and behave. Obey the law; don't carry out "unlawful acts". He even directly criticised the students and told them that talk about autonomy beyond the control of Beijing, or what Beijing likes to portray as calls for independence, is just not acceptable - it is not scholarly or an academic debate but advocacy for a policy that is simply unacceptable under "one country".
Also, the economic policies laid out in the policy address may help him. More housing for the sandwich class, lots of money for poor pensioners and retirees, and attention to poverty could all enhance his stature and win public support.
Without saying it directly, Leung has put the education sector on notice that a soft form of "enlightenment" may be on the way. He reintroduced a form of "national education" by calling for the "renewal" of the curriculum in Chinese and world history, and saying that the training of teachers will be "enhanced". It sounds like some revision of the content of school teaching materials will take place.
And alternative, less controversial, measures targeted at reforming the way young people think about the mainland are also to be funded. Students should visit the mainland at least twice, once during their primary years, and again during their secondary school time. The number of twinning programmes between Hong Kong and mainland schools should reach 600.
This policy address will be very well received in Beijing. At the recent fourth plenum, President Xi Jinping emphasised the "rule of law under the leadership of the Communist Party" which can be readily translated into "rule by law", or the idea that everyone should obey the law. It is clearly not the sense that the courts are an independent political force that could challenge the party. And that sounds a lot like Leung's view, expressed in his policy address, that the rule of law does not accept civil disobedience.
In spring, we wondered whether Leung might favour the collapse of political reform. Now it looks like he should. If the reform package is voted down by the pan-democrats and the nominating committee does not come into existence, Hong Kong's next election should follow previous formats, whereby the Election Committee votes for the chief executive, with no popular input at all.
While Leung has been calling on the people of Hong Kong to accept Beijing's proffered model of "universal suffrage", he must realise he is likely to do better when voting is limited to an Election Committee compared with an election under universal suffrage, where he may face a contest against pro-Beijing candidates who are much more popular.
And if Beijing decides he is their man, that he has done a yeoman's job in managing these difficult days, that he prevented the city from sinking into chaos, then the top leaders are likely to support him.
Roll the clock forward two years and we may see Hong Kong under stress, first from the street, as students and pan-democrats perhaps violently oppose the use of the Election Committee for the 2017 election. And also from Beijing and the Hong Kong government, which maintains a very tough posture against popular protests that, in their view, threaten to send Hong Kong into chaos.
So, maybe the pan-democrats should reconsider their opposition to the political reform package. Otherwise, two years from now, we may all see a renewed and re-energised Leung, backed by Beijing and using the rule of law to try to impose more order on Hong Kong.
