The US has increasingly turned to unilateral legal action to address its concerns vis-à-vis China, whether on trade, security, commercial espionage, or otherwise. The tool of choice for the Office of the US Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce has been the statutory authority derived from decades-old pieces of legislation that enable the executive branch to address unfair trade practices on a variety of grounds.

While these actions appear to be part of a coherent whole, precipitating a shift in the US approach to China, the reality is that they all originate from existing legal authority and intend to address discrete issues involving individual Chinese nationals or Chinese government practices.

The fact that they seem to be moving forwards in succession does not mean they comprise a whole-of-government effort to undermine or discriminate against China. The Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party, however, see them as just that.

Though Chinese officials may recognise that the US political system is comprised of three separate but equal branches of government, their responses to US actions suggest they see them as part of a top-down directive from President Donald Trump to target China.

But, ultimately, this misunderstanding results from China’s belief that the paramount leader has ultimate authority to dictate government actions and intervene where necessary — just as he does in China’s system.

US officials have also exhibited their misaligned expectations vis-à-vis China’s legal system during the course of recent tensions. China’s legislature – the National People’s Congress – effectively acts as a rubber-stamp parliament that takes its direction from the party leadership.

Ultimately, while NPC delegates will deliberate over specific legal provisions, any draft law will have been signed off by the top – that is, President Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee.

Such amendments and legislation may have fallen short of US government and business community expectations, but they do show that US pressure has precipitated some previously unseen results when it comes to so-called structural reforms to China’s economic practices.

Negotiators should have noted the steps Beijing has taken to address US complaints through its legislative process in recent months and recognised that it was unlikely to go further in the near term.

This is not to suggest they should have watered down their demands. But to realise only in the last week of negotiations that China would not commit to enacting specific legislative amendments to account for the provisions of a potential trade deal suggests US officials had unrealistic expectations.

China’s annual legislative session and bi-monthly NPC Standing Committee meetings are carefully coordinated endeavours involving little real debate and are in no way equipped to enact sweeping changes to legislation on an accelerated time frame – particularly in response to pressure from a foreign power.

It is important for each side to recognise these nuances. Chinese officials should appreciate that, despite recent indications to the contrary, the US abides by the rule of law and does not simply discriminate against Chinese nationals or entities on an ad hoc basis (Huawei, for its part, has seemed to appreciate the legal recourse mechanisms it enjoys in the US).

On the other side, while the ambition of US trade negotiators is admirable, they should recognise that China will not overhaul its legal system – and in turn, its economic development model – overnight.

Such an understanding on both sides will make for more candid and honest discussions around points of friction and prevent recent tension from spiralling into a long-term, tit-for-tat cycle of legal action and corresponding retaliation.

Austin Lowe is a Washington-based consultant and analyst specialising in US-China relations and Asia policy. The views expressed are his own.