The US is all talk when trying to compete with Chinese investment in Central Asia and elsewhere
- Just as Central Asia’s dependence on China is an unfortunate reality, so is the participation of Huawei in Britain’s 5G network. Washington’s failure to acknowledge basic realities was on show during the US secretary of state’s recent tour
International visits by American officials in the Donald Trump era tend to be heavy on aggressive warnings and light on promises. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has just wrapped up a five-nation tour of Europe and Central Asia during which China-bashing emerged as the only consistent theme.
In the United States’ first cabinet-level visit to Central Asia in half a decade, Pompeo pledged (pending congressional approval) US$1 million of technical assistance to Uzbekistan in developing its capital markets. In the context of China-Central Asia relations, seven-figure sums are pocket change.
On his sweeping tour of the region after launching his now-famous Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese President Xi Jinping signed US$56 billion worth of deals in Central Asia.
While declining to step up to the plate, US officials frequently lambast countries for engaging with the Belt and Road Initiative, drawing on the language of “debt-trap diplomacy” to warn borrowers off Chinese credit.
While Chinese belt and road funding can genuinely be linked to corruption, poor environmental standards, and debt risk, US criticism of China, particularly given the lack of viable alternatives, only reinforces a popular characterisation of Western voices as patronising and unsympathetic. Meanwhile, many leaders in the Western Balkans and Africa see China as a partner that treats them like equals.
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Anti-Chinese sentiment runs high in Kyrgyzstan and people there are generally clear-eyed about the risks of working with Beijing. In other words, they would welcome a US alternative to closer alignment with China. In the absence of a US-led offering, the poor, mountainous republic can only rely on Chinese debt for much-needed infrastructure plans.
US rhetoric on China not only distances target audiences, it fails to acknowledge basic economic and geographical realities. In praising the transparency and environmental standards of US companies while urging Kazakhstan to eschew cooperation with China, Pompeo optimistically overlooks the fact that Kazakhstan is several thousand kilometres from the US, while it shares a border of more than 1,000km (621 miles) with China.
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Britain’s recent decision takes into account the risks associated with Huawei and mitigates them with a range of measures, including capping Huawei’s participation at 35 per cent.
Just as Central Asia’s dependence on China is an unfortunate reality, so too is the participation of Huawei in the world’s 5G networks. This failure to acknowledge and respond to realities is at the heart of the US’ inability to effectively compete with China.
Chinese power is a fact of 21st-century geopolitics. The US does not seem to have woken up to this fact, but smaller countries, especially those neighbouring China, have long been cognisant of this reality. Threatened by the rise of Chinese power, many countries are desperately trying to redress the balance, and many would welcome more active US involvement.
In countries like Kazakhstan, where the US already has a strong record of investment, the opportunities are huge. But US foreign policy needs to realise that countries can no longer ignore China. Where it can offer alternatives to cooperation with China, it should. Action speaks louder than words, and it is certainly more effective than making empty, threatening noises.
Jacob Mardell is a freelance researcher at the Mercator Institute for China Studies who is currently travelling the belt and road