US must show China its strategic ambiguity on Taiwan is backed by serious deterrent
- Any shift away from the current US policy of declaratory ambiguity – by stating clearly it will defend Taiwan in case of an attack – will be highly dangerous and must be avoided
- Instead, the US must repair its now fraying deterrent threat and build up its capabilities to mount such a defence
01:22
Taiwan posts video of troops ‘fending off attack from mainland’ amid worsening cross-strait tensions
China experts have strongly criticised this article, warning that such a shift in US policy would destabilise the region and even bring on the attack it was designed to prevent.
China, US miscalculations of Korean war can happen again, with Taiwan
Strategic ambiguity has its origins in the early 1950s as US president Dwight Eisenhower faced the growing possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan’s Quemoy-Matsu island chain. He feared a US declaration of no-defence for the islands would invite a Chinese attack, much as many believed Dean Acheson’s exclusion of South Korea in his 1950 Perimeter Defence speech caused the Korean war.
Eisenhower desperately wanted to avoid US military intervention, which would almost certainly result in nuclear warfare against the Chinese mainland, millions of deaths and war with the Soviet Union. But though Eisenhower’s public declarations were equivocal, US military power was unmistakable and more than capable of defending the region against China.
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Any attempt to seek ‘Taiwan independence’ is a dead end, says China
Beijing’s increasing belligerence is troubling, and a reflection of its growing belief that it can launch a devastating cross-channel attack. This is an opinion echoed by many US strategic planners who contend that such an attack would rapidly overwhelm Taiwanese defences even with US assistance, and who predict that “Taiwan would fold in a week or two”.
Rather than declaring a clear US commitment to defend Taiwan, the US should instead remain faithful to Eisenhower’s combination of declaratory ambiguity and strategic clarity by building a convincing capability to defend Taiwan, while repeatedly stressing that the costs to China of such an attack, whether victorious or not, would be prohibitive.
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Military drills in Taiwan Strait are ‘necessary’ as US envoy Keith Krach visits island, China says
It was ultimately successful because of the invaluable experience gained from previous US landings in North Africa and Italy, where the US nearly suffered a disastrous setback at Anzio. These operations created a battle-hardened army and provided Eisenhower with important tactical information needed to plan the liberation of Europe.
Even so, Normandy’s success required one of the greatest campaigns in psychological warfare in history to convince Germany that the cross-channel attack would be against Calais instead. Mishaps nearly caused the Normandy mission’s failure at the coastline, costing the lives of thousands of US soldiers at Omaha Beach alone.
Worse yet, Allied planners were unaware of the nearly 4,000 massive hedgerows surrounding the Normandy region, which gave the Germans an excellent vantage point. Thousands of Allied soldiers died fighting to cut through the hedges. One wonders what today’s battle simulations would say about the prospects for Allied victory in 1944.
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Chinese veterans of Korean War call for peace as tensions with US mount
Theodore Roosevelt once said: “Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far.” The US should remember this dictum when it comes to the Taiwan Strait, only that the US must also repair its stick so its soft words can convince China of the value of maintaining the status quo.
Gregory Mitrovich is a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University