“I remain convinced that a successful China can make our country more prosperous, not less,” wrote Joe Biden, then US vice-president, in an op-ed almost a decade ago. “As trade and investment bind us together, we have a stake in each other’s success.”
In recent years, however, both Biden and his top advisers have taken an increasingly hawkish stance on China, abandoning the whole rhetoric of “strategic empathy” and constructive engagement. In a more recent column, Biden warned of “swift economic sanctions” against China and argued, “The United States does need to get tough on China.”
In fact, the Democratic Party as a whole has embraced a more aggressive China strategy, underscoring a growing bipartisan consensus in Washington. Thus, Biden’s victory has presented profound dilemmas for Asian leaders, especially Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who has opted for warmer ties with Beijing.
If anything, the Philippine strongman would also be concerned about a more aggressive democracy-promotion policy by the incoming Democrat in the White House. No wonder, then, that earlier this year Duterte endorsed his populist counterpart, US President Donald Trump, who has studiously shunned human rights and democracy issues with key allies such as the Philippines.
By instinct and political calculus, however, the Biden administration is likely to pursue functional and civil relations with the Philippines as part of a broader multilateral strategy against China.
Contrary to the polls, the Democratic presidential candidate failed to secure a decisive victory. Hopes for a “blue wave” down the ballot were also quashed by Republican resilience in battleground states.
With the Republicans probably retaining their iron grip over the Senate and across federal courts, and Democrats suffering a smaller majority in the lower house, Biden will oversee a divided government.
More crucially, he will be a “crisis president”, confronting the triple disasters of an economic recession, public health emergency and post-election polarisation, with Trump openly casting doubt on the integrity of the elections.
The upshot is a diminished presidency and, accordingly, a greater need for pragmatism and caution, especially in global affairs. On the one hand, Biden is expected to compartmentalise foreign relations by pursuing cooperation not only with allies but even rivals such as China on shared global concerns, most especially climate change.
On the other hand, he will seek a multilateral approach to constrain the strategic ambitions of China, and also Russia and Iran. And this means that the Biden administration will solicit maximum support from treaty allies such as the Philippines, which is at the forefront of the South China Sea disputes.
For the past century, the Philippines has been a pivotal element of American projection of power in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout the Cold War, the Southeast Asian country hosted the US’ largest overseas military bases. Last year, the two allies conducted 280 joint military exercises, more than any of America’s Indo-Pacific partners.
Nonetheless, the future of the alliance is in doubt, largely thanks to Duterte’s pursuit of warmer ties with China and Russia and, more crucially, his threat to cancel key defence deals with the US.
In February, the Filipino president unilaterally initiated an end to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which has facilitated the entry and exit of tens of thousands of American troops over the past two decades.
Duterte justified the move as retaliation against US sanctions on his key domestic allies, including former Philippine police chief Ronald dela Rosa, over the scorched-earth war on drugs policy in the Philippines. The move threatened to jeopardise more than half the scheduled joint military activities with the US, including drills in the South China Sea to enhance interoperability against China.
By June, however, the Philippines temporarily suspended the VFA termination amid rising tensions in the disputed waters. This week, it extended that suspension, “in appreciative recognition” of Washington’s part in keeping the South China Sea stable, but the ultimate fate of the crucial agreement remains unclear.
The Biden administration will have to deal with key regional allies such as the Philippines, or risk losing access to bases bordering the South China Sea.
For years, the Pentagon has been pushing for greater access to the Basa and Bautista airbases, which are close to the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands respectively. The Trump administration has also been pressuring Manila to reject Chinese investments in strategic sectors, especially telecommunications.
In the coming months, Duterte is likely to leverage the VFA to seek concessions from the Biden administration, including on prospective sanctions related to human rights and democracy. Duterte will also demand tangible American trade, investment and Covid-19-related commitments.
Thus, expect some tough strategic bargaining between the two allies, as each side seeks to extract maximum support for their own political and strategic interests. Biden needs the Philippines’ help on China, while Duterte needs political and personal reassurances from the new US president.
A decade ago, Biden favoured a policy of “strategic empathy” for China, believing the rise of the Asian powerhouse is a win-win for both superpowers and the global economy. Today, he will need to pursue constructive engagement and embrace “strategic empathy” for tricky allies and China’s rivals in the South China Sea, especially the Philippines.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific” and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”