To get young Hongkongers to take up mainland job opportunities, build trust and avoid politics
- Those who want to work on the mainland will go, but the government should not expect a one-off policy to resolve anti-mainland sentiment among Hong Kong youths
- Young people need to know the benefits and risks of working on the mainland, as well as the practical, psychological and emotional issues they might face
When I heard Lam’s plan, I recalled a meeting in autumn 2019 with five of my MA students, four from the mainland and one local. I asked about their post-graduation plans. One mainlander encouraged the Hong Kong student to consider moving north, where he might get a higher salary in Guangdong. His response: he would gladly earn 30 per cent less in return for continued access to Facebook.
As the Hong Kong government rolls out the programme, who is likely to see it positively and head north? A 2009 study – which I directed – supported by the Central Policy Unit interviewed 235 Hongkongers living on the mainland, while a 2015 study looked at Hong Kong youth’s perceptions of the mainland.
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In 2009, sojourners became more “Chinese” living on the mainland. While 14 per cent saw themselves as Hongkongers before moving, only 2 per cent felt that way after moving north. Those identifying as Hongkongers and Chinese before moving decreased from 23 per cent to 14 per cent, while those feeling “Chinese but also a Hongkonger” or just Chinese rose from 16 per cent to 28 per cent.
Second, most Hongkongers had a positive experience on the mainland as 6.1 per cent liked it very much and 74.9 per cent liked it. Meanwhile, 15.8 per cent disliked it and 3.2 per cent disliked it very much.
Who adapted poorly? Those with few friends on the mainland, those dissatisfied with the quality of life in China and people possessed of a stronger Hong Kong identity.
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New ID card to give Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan residents access to public services on mainland China
In 2015, trust in Beijing was low and affected by age. Among 18-34 year-olds, 9.5 per cent said they trusted Beijing, 29.3 per cent were “in-between” and 61.2 per cent expressed “distrust”. For those aged 35-54, 25.8 per cent registered trust, 44.6 per cent were in-between and 29.5 per cent were distrusting, while those over 55 were most trusting, at 35.9 per cent, 34.6 per cent and 29.5 per cent respectively.
However, while 55.8 per cent of young people were willing to participate in mainland internships, which enhanced their resumes, the figures for job-seeking and academic study were 37.4 per cent and 29.3 per cent respectively.
Who was willing to work on the mainland in 2015? Men and those who rated the mainland more highly, viewed China opportunities favourably and saw little difficulty in getting a suitable job across the border were significantly more willing to work on the mainland.
Additionally, in 2009, those who adapted best included those who volunteered, were older and employees of a Hong Kong company working on the mainland. Those working for a mainland company had more difficulty.
The most important action Lam can take is not to politicise the programme. People who want to go, probably those born on the mainland or children of a mainland parent, and those with a strong Chinese identity, will go. The government should not expect a one-off policy like this to resolve hostility among Hong Kong youths towards the mainland.
The programme also needs transparency. Young people need to know the benefits and risks of working on the mainland and the advantages such a job may bring to their careers. Moreover, there are practical, psychological and emotional issues that need to be addressed if the programme is to succeed. After all, they really are two systems.
David Zweig is Professor Emeritus at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and director of Transnational China Consulting Limited