Lahore blast reaction shows normalised India-Pakistan ties are no sure thing

Backchannel talks between New Delhi and Islamabad had succeeded in reducing tensions but failed to reach an agreement over Kashmir
Pakistan accusing India of instigating terror in its territory might be supported by China over the convergence of interests created by India’s intransigence

Saman Rizwan

Published: 6:45am, 20 Jul 2021

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Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf held a press briefing on July 4 to share developments about last month’s explosion in Lahore. The evidence acquired through multiple investigations revealed India’s apparent involvement in the act of terrorism, he said.

Yusuf claimed they had intelligence about a foreign agency, adding that, “... today without a doubt I want to say, [the circumstances] of this entire attack lead to Indian-sponsored terrorism”.

The revelations come as the two countries were attempting to create a workable relationship. Earlier this year, both sides indicated they would dial down hostilities at the Line of Control, which divides Kashmir into Pakistan- and India-administered parts.

Pakistan stopped calling the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) government a fascist regime, while India avoided blaming Pakistan for every terrorist attack in India-controlled Kashmir. In backchannel talks, both sides also resolved not to allow negotiations to become hostage to the next terrorist attack.

Each side seemingly reduced their bellicose rhetoric. Moreover, the possibility of China playing a role in breaking the ice between the two countries cannot be overstated.

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The Kashmir conflict

The ceasefire could have resulted in doors opening for development and mobility for the people of Kashmir. Instead, we are at another standstill.

In conciliatory speeches at the Pakistan Air Force Academy in February and the Islamabad Security Dialogue in March, Pakistani army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa made no mention of the UN resolutions on Kashmir or restoring the region’s semi-autonomous status.

Specifically, Pakistan was looking for a token of concession from India so it could sell the backchannel talks to its public, political parties, civil society and intelligentsia. Otherwise, the whole process would have looked like a sell-out and surrender of Kashmir to India.

In their conversations, Pakistan had demanded that India restore Article 35A of the constitution, which would preserve Kashmir’s demographics. However, the multiparty meeting called by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tells a different story. Hinting at restoring Kashmir’s status without reinstating the special rights of indigenous Kashmiris under Article 35A indicates the BJP’s ambitions to normalise Kashmir as a regular Indian state and not a disputed region.

This denied Pakistan a face-saving opportunity to project the backchannel process as a success. Meanwhile, plans to keep Ladakh as a Union territory geographically and politically detached from the Kashmir problem provide the foundations for Chinese anger.

The close proximity of the earlier normalisation of ties and the agreement between India and China to end the military skirmishes in Ladakh is seen by some as a part of China’s recent engagement with the Kashmir issue.

It might not be a stretch to say the recent hiccup by Pakistan accusing India of involvement in instigating terror within its territory might be supported by China owing to the convergence of interests created by India’s refusal to take any step back from its decision on Kashmir’s status.

Anniversary of loss of special status for Indian-held Kashmir sparks protests on Pakistan side

Given that China sees itself as a major stakeholder in the Kashmir equation, it will not let Ladakh become insulated from the larger question. Moreover, Pakistan and China share a common threat perception with regards to India and these convergences cannot be evaluated separate from each other.

From Pakistan’s standpoint, the change in its policy can be attributed to a major paradigm shift in its national security doctrine where normalising relations with India and peace in the region seemed pivotal. Bajwa’s Islamabad Security Dialogue speech referred to the creation of a “conducive environment” in Kashmir for the peace process to move forward, though he did not demand anything specific.

By agreeing to normalise its ties with India, Pakistan wanted to focus on dealing with the potential consequences of the US exit from Afghanistan and fixing its weakening economy. It also wants to use the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a linchpin to help transform Pakistan into a country that can provide for its people economically as well as militarily.

On India’s part, the main change necessitating a reduction in hostilities with Pakistan was the fear of a two-front war with Pakistan and China following the border stand-off with the latter in the Himalayan region. India needs time to plug these gaps and build defence structures on border with China, and that requires pacification of border tensions with Pakistan.

14:05

Health workers trek to remote areas to bring Covid-19 vaccines to Indian-administered Kashmir

Normalisation with Pakistan could also be driven by the Indian desire to gradually open Kashmir by restoring suspended civil liberties and limited internet access. This would also allow India to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic and focus on its role in the Quad security grouping – which also includes Japan, Australia and the US – in dealing with China.

Arguably, China’s expanding role in Kashmir can provide an incentive for both Pakistan and China to work together in addressing the plight of the Kashmiri people. Its increasing influence can also alter the existing strategic equilibrium as the issue is not bilateral any more.

It is important to highlight that the recent agreements India reached with Pakistan and China are interlinked. There is more than what meets the eye in these peace overtures as well as the recent derailment of the peace process in light of the Lahore attack.

Saman Rizwan is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research in Islamabad. She tweets @sa__rizwan