Protests in Kazakhstan, under the iron rule of Nursultan Nazarbayev for 29 years, have by nature been different from those in other former Soviet states.
While the demonstrations in the other states have mainly been accompanied by demands for fair elections, the expressions of public discontent in Kazakhstan in 2011 and 2016 were driven less by political factors than economic ones.
In Kazakhstan, the first protests associated with regime change occurred in 2019, as Nazarbayev’s successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was elected president with about 70 per cent of the vote. Detractors, however, described the poll as a sham and an “illusion” of a democratic handover of power.
The current unrest is a continuation of that earlier popular upsurge, but more extensive and brutal. The spark that set off the protests this time was the government’s lifting of price caps for liquefied petroleum gas.
Fuel prices nearly doubled to 120 tenge (US$0.28) a litre, compounding the economic strain caused by the pandemic and leading to a more vocal outcry.
Although it has since become clear that the bloody escalation was driven by a power tussle between the country’s political elites supporting the former and current presidents, socio-economic issues continue to loom large.
Polls in 2021 found growing despondency among the public; the share of Kazakhs assessing their economic prospects favourably fell to 30 per cent, from 50 per cent in 2019.
In addition, the country’s consumer debt increased sharply, by 26 per cent, in 2021. Local experts have blamed the crisis on the “disorientation of the state apparatus” that was designed by Nazarbayev.
This was clear from the crowds shouting “Old Man Out!”, in reference to Nazarbayev’s continuing grip on power, even after he stepped down as president. The protests were perhaps unique, as they were directed against a former president and his circle, instead of the sitting president.
Back in 2019, Tokayev acknowledged that the protests surrounding his election were motivated by socioeconomic issues. He later initiated political reforms, including official recognition of opposition parties.
However, given the authoritarian system in which Nazarbayev continued to reign supreme as head of the national security council, Tokayev’s reforms were perhaps never going to go far.
One main upshot of the latest protests is Tokayev’s decision to assume this key security role himself, effectively ousting Nazarbayev and ending a political duopoly. The fact that it was done with Nazarbayev’s consent speaks to a power transition.
The protests that began on January 2 swiftly turned violent, and there have been several days of gunfire, arson and looting. At least 18 law enforcement officers were killed, including two who were decapitated. The government has since confirmed 44 deaths and about 8,000 arrests.
As the crisis threatened to spiral out of control, the Kazakh president called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Moscow-based alliance of six former Soviet countries including Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to send a peacekeeping force to quell the unrest.
Tokayev also characterised the protests as an attack on the country by up to 20,000 “bandits”, and said they were part of a foreign terrorist plot.
According to the Russian media, the CSTO peacekeeping force deployed to Kazakhstan consisted of up to 2,500 personnel, mostly Russians. The time frame for the deployment was not specified.
Notably, this is the first time in the history of the Moscow-based alliance that its protection clause has been invoked. It is thus an important milestone in the development of security architecture in the post-Soviet era.
Russia remained rather restrained in its statements to allow the CSTO to exhibit its authority. Pundits have noted that the peacekeeping operation would be a win for Moscow if it could gain a foothold in Kazakhstan, with its troops as guarantors of peace and stability.
Monitoring the situation in Kazakhstan, China expressed hope for the restoration of social order, but also stressed that it was an internal affair. Only later did the Chinese say they were prepared to intervene too, via the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Regional security is a priority for Beijing, which is casting a wary eye at a terrorist threat in Xinjiang amid volatility in the neighbouring area; China also has vital economic interests in Central Asia, in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative.
However, Beijing is less willing to get involved in other countries’ domestic affairs, and prefers to act through multilateral formats such as the SCO.
Although the situation in Kazakhstan seems to be under control for the time being, the international implications will only become clear later. The country could become another bone of contention between Russia and the West. Already, the United States and the European Union have called for human rights to be respected in Kazakhstan, even as Russia and China regard the demonstrations as the result of foreign intervention.
Washington has also questioned the legitimacy of the Russian deployment to Kazakhstan, while Brussels has said the operation brings back “memories of situations to be avoided”.
Other former Soviet states facing similar instability could follow in Kazakhstan’s footsteps and request reinforcement from Russian-led forces.
Washington is witnessing Moscow’s growing potential to ensure the vitality of Russian-allied regimes. All this might pull the two countries further apart, and add to the tensions surrounding this week’s multiparty security talks.
Danil Bochkov is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council