EU is too important, diplomatically and economically, for China to neglect relations
Some might argue that the EU does not matter to China, but the bloc’s diplomatic and trade heft means Beijing should work to improve ties
The EU serves as a critical counterweight to the US, is China’s second-largest trading partner, and a key pillar in Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world
Two concepts have increasingly taken centre stage in geopolitical discussions around the European Union. The first is “strategic autonomy”, the second, “de-risking”.
There was much fanfare around the first, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to China in April. It centred on the notion that Europe would rise above the fray of US-China tensions and embrace Macron’s calls for an EU that puts European interests first and takes the side of neither the United States nor China.
Such hopes were swiftly dashed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered in European countries – especially small and medium-sized former Soviet states – a heightened sense of concern over national security and collective European defiance.
Many have come to painfully realise the costs of relying too heavily on Russia for oil and gas. This has given rise to the notion of de-risking – a vague term, invoked by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which broadly gestures at the need to reduce European dependence on foreign actors across strategically sensitive sectors while falling short of full decoupling.
By de-risking, the EU should in theory seek to reduce overexposure to all external economies. However, for many politicians and bureaucrats in Europe, the risk primarily stems from Russia and China.
This world view reflects the increasing strain in Sino-European relations. This has been amplified by the efforts of the US and its allies to curb China’s technological progress and shore up security in the Indo-Pacific.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaks during a plenary session at the EU Parliament on January 18. Photo: DPA
Some might argue that the EU, as with the rest of the Old World, does not matter to China. To these people, attempts at improving relations are a waste of time. Instead, I would call doing so realistic.
The EU matters greatly to China, for at least three reasons. First, the bloc serves as a critical counterweight against a US-led coalition that considers China its primary geopolitical competitor. Most European states prefer not to choose between their two biggest economic partners.
Second, the EU is China’s second-largest trading partner behind the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with total trade in 2022 reaching nearly US$850 billion. As Beijing seeks to reboot the economy amid sluggish domestic consumption and high household debt, securing the confidence of foreign multinational firms and stabilising supply chains is of paramount importance.
Third, the EU is a key pillar in Beijing’s vision for a multipolar world order. European countries do not harbour a desire for hegemony. The EU’s greatest asset lies in its ability to lead and shape institutional norms without seeking financial or geopolitical dominance.
Senior Chinese diplomats are well aware that Europe is too important to alienate. Even so, improving relations from the nadir of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment collapsing two years ago requires concrete action and an understanding of European hearts and minds.
Most European states have clearly staked out their stance on the Ukraine war. As German and Estonian representatives affirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the price for peace in Ukraine cannot be Kyiv making vast concessions to Moscow as that would jeopardise the EU’s core national security interests. A need to affirm solidarity and moral authority has meant that smaller states in particular are likely to stand up against Russian violations of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.
Having spoken to stakeholders throughout the EU, I am convinced European politicians genuinely prefer not to take sides between the US and China where possible.
Trade with China and the transatlantic relationship are both highly significant. Yet, if the perception of China’s support for Russia were to persist and should Europe conclude that a China-led coalition cannot help facilitate peace in Ukraine, the scales would tip in favour of the EU establishing more robust strategic and military ties with the US. In international relations, perception – not intent – is key.
Also, European talk of de-risking reflects a growing wariness over the tenuous peace in the Indo-Pacific. Next year’s US election could return to power an erratic, unhinged ultranationalist in Donald Trump, whose closest intraparty contender Ron DeSantis is a neoconservative also bent on containing China.
Talk of war portends escalating tensions over the Taiwan Strait, where a recent near-collision between Chinese and American warships serves to illustrate how dangerously close the world is to a hot showdown between superpowers.
De-risking through friend-shoring, near-shoring, stockpiling and cultivating home-grown resilience in relation to strategic minerals is thus in equal parts a response to the war in Ukraine and a pre-emption of worsening flare-ups in East Asia. The latter would put further pressure on the EU via sanctions, counter-sanctions and supply-chain disruptions.
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French and EU leaders urge China to ‘bring Russia to its senses’ and stop invasion of Ukraine
French and EU leaders urge China to ‘bring Russia to its senses’ and stop invasion of Ukraine
Finally, Beijing must do more to assuage the concerns of European businesses. A core feature of any healthy economy is its ability to convince investors and companies that there is much that will keep it going.
Joerg Wuttke, the outgoing head of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, has expressed concerns over China’s growth trajectory for the next one to two decades. Wuttke is no China-basher; he speaks with authority and much experience in the country. The more pessimistic that European firms are about China’s economic prospects, the less likely direct investment will be.
In contrast, those convinced China is again shifting into a pro-growth mindset – underpinned by strengthening intellectual property safeguards and the interests of private business – are likely to eschew the zero-sum rationale of recent years. Sino-European relations will remain fraught, but this is not a time for resignation.
Brian Wong is a DPhil in Politics candidate at Balliol College, Oxford, a Rhodes Scholar (Hong Kong 2020), and the founding editor-in-chief of the Oxford Political Review
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