Why ‘ironclad friend’ Cambodia might just be China’s model ally
As China’s partners face domestic troubles, Cambodia’s stability makes it an outlier. The relationship is more transactional than others, with no ideological bond – in many ways a good basis for regional cooperation
If Beijing stops and looks around, its friends aren’t doing too well. Its “no limits” comrade in Moscow just survived a mercenary mutiny with a column of a few thousand irregulars and ex-criminals almost strolling into the capital. And Iran is still reeling from protests after Mahsa Amini died in “morality police” custody last year.
The “anti-hegemonic” coalition of China, Russia and Iran, as former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski forecast in 1997 (what historian Niall Ferguson now calls the “axis of ill will”), looks increasingly fragile.
Nearer home, Laos is so badly in debt to China that Beijing is likely to have to write off billions of dollars at some point – not a great look for the export of its infrastructure-led development model. Myanmar’s junta wants Beijing to offer international cover as it perpetuates civil war, but also wants to weaken its dependency on China through engagement with India and Russia. Pakistan is, as the Economist put it, in “perma-crisis”.
Whatever inroads China made in Thailand and the Philippines have hit a dead end. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has returned the country to its pro-Western agenda, while a coalition set to take power in Bangkok next month is expected to be more pro-US.
That makes Cambodia, an “ironclad friend”, something of an outlier. It often looks like the least troubled of China’s closest Asian partners and usually delivers only good news. To be the ambassador in Phnom Penh must be one of the easiest jobs for a Chinese diplomat. Cambodia isn’t badly in hock; national debt was just 33.7 per cent of gross domestic product last year.
It has close trading relations with Western nations, its main export partners, allowing Chinese companies in the country to make handsome profits. In the first quarter of this year, China had a US$2.2 billion trade surplus with Cambodia. Its housing market often resembles a bubble waiting to burst, but it’s proven sturdy enough for the Chinese who want to invest there for their retirement.
The entrance of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone in Cambodia on May 21. Cambodia celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative this year, highlighting its great contributions to the kingdom’s socioeconomic development and poverty reduction. Photo: Xinhua
The country’s government may be increasingly dictatorial but it’s stable. The ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is assured total victory at the general election on July 23, and Prime Minister Hun Sen is likely to orchestrate a peaceful power transfer to his eldest son.
Cambodia’s government may or may not have secretly agreed to let the People’s Liberation Army station troops at its Ream naval base, but the fact that Washington, which takes this seriously, continues to increase its aid to, and trade with, Phnom Penh indicates that Cambodia is able to profit from the West and China without fully aligning with one side.
Put differently, wouldn’t Beijing prefer that Laos and Myanmar are more like Cambodia? Last November, the Global Times dubbed the China-Cambodia relationship “a model of regional cooperation at a time when the world is full of challenges”.
But there’s something of a contradiction. In many ways, the China-Cambodia friendship is more transactional than Beijing’s relations with other countries. There is no ideological bond between the two countries, unlike for Laos or Cuba, for instance. Phnom Penh isn’t forced to make nice with Beijing to avoid conflict.
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Cambodia welcomes its first tour group from China since Covid pandemic
Cambodia welcomes its first tour group from China since Covid pandemic
Hun Sen, Cambodia’s prime minister since 1985, once called China “the root of everything that is evil” in Cambodia. His government came to power in 1979 by ousting the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge regime.
Yet it isn’t the only authoritarian regime to forge closer relations with Beijing to offset criticism and rancour from Western democracies. And Hun Sen appears content with the Chinese partnership, especially after he was assured of new investment during his visit to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping in February. It also seems Xi gave the nod of approval for Hun Sen to hand over power to his eldest son, Hun Manet, in a dynastic succession.
Lieutenant General Hun Manet delivers a speech while presiding over a military equipment delivery ceremony at the National Olympic Stadium in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on June 18, 2020. Photo: AP
But what happens when Chinese investment streams into Cambodia start to dry up?
Phnom Penh could well turn around, thank Beijing for all the infrastructure it has built (such as US$2 billion Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville expressway), and then focus on re-engaging Western democracies, shipping its exports through the same roads and ports that China has funded.
It’s far easier to imagine Cambodia becoming more evenly aligned with the United States, Japan and Europe (as it was during the 2000s and early 2010s) than it is to imagine the same for Laos or the Myanmar junta, or even other Chinese partners like Iran and Russia.
US President Joe Biden shakes hands with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen at the Asean summit on November 12 last year in Phnom Penh. Photo: AP
Despite Washington’s opprobrium at Phnom Penh’s “ironclad friendship” with Beijing, Cambodia’s trade in goods with the US grew from US$4.2 billion in 2018 to over US$12.6 billion last year. Indeed, Washington doesn’t act as though it has “lost” Cambodia to China, even if that’s what some in the US capital might think.
Beijing ought also to be concerned about Cambodia’s “hedging” with Vietnam, the ruling CPP’s traditional patron. The Cambodia-China-Vietnam triangle of relations is little understood, but Hanoi has significantly increased investment in its western neighbour in recent years, and bilateral trade rose from US$3.8 billion in 2017 to over US$10.5 billion last year (compared to China-Cambodia trade of US$14.5 billion last year).
Phnom Penh’s skylines are dominated by Chinese-built office buildings and condominiums, while coastal Sihanoukville is politely referred to as “new Shenzhen”, or less positively as a “Chinese colony”. Military relations are close. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, it seemed as though a contingent of Cambodian officials or ruling party-aligned associations was jetting off to Beijing for training each week. But China’s influence in Cambodia is by no means monopolistic nor permanent.
David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies and Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. As a journalist, he was based in Cambodia between 2014-2019
