How India is gaining ground in its Indo-Pacific maritime contest with China

India is not just boosting its military and deterrence but also deepening cooperation with Quad nations, Asean and the Pacific islands
But with India still no match for China, it is likely to work on increasing collective pressure while avoiding military measures that would invite a Beijing blowback

Asma Khalid

Published: 1:00am, 17 Aug 2023

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On August 10, Chinese warship Hai Yang 24 Hao, a surveillance vessel, called at the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo. Its arrival coincided with the Malabar exercises off the east coast of Australia. The 10-day drills involve submarines and aircraft from India, Japan, Australia and the United States – all members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

En route to Sydney’s shores, Indian naval warships sailed through Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, showcasing India’s growing interest in stronger military and diplomatic ties with the Pacific nations.

These developments reflect the deepening maritime competition between China and India. In recent years, India’s efforts to counterbalance China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean region have started to gain ground in the South China Sea and the Pacific.

China’s maritime route stretches via the South China Sea and Malacca Strait to the Indian Ocean, splitting at Sri Lanka’s ports. One route leads to the Persian Gulf via the northern Arabian Sea, the other reaches the Mediterranean Sea through the Gulf of Aden. Considered maritime “lifelines” by Chinese leaders, these routes are safeguarded by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the intelligence and logistics support of the Chinese companies controlling or operating hundreds of ports along the routes.

India’s primary maritime boundaries span from the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, through Malacca and Singapore, to reach up to the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden and the East Coast of Africa.

(From left) Vice-Admiral Saito Akira, commander in chief of Japan’s Self Defence Fleet, Rear Admiral Christopher Smith, commander of the Australian Fleet, Vice-Admiral Dinesh Tripathi, commanding-in-chief of India’s Western Naval Command, and Vice-Admiral Karl Thomas, commander of the US 7th Fleet, speak with each other in Sydney, Australia on August 10, as India, Japan, the US and Australia hold their first Malabar naval exercise off Australia. Photo: Reuters

The Malabar exercises, held for the first time in Australia, have also been organised in the Indian Ocean region, East China Sea, Philippine Sea and Guam. India has refrained so far from joining maritime exercises in disputed South China Sea regions. Such a move, improbable for now, would be extremely confrontational – and likely to arise only if China establishes a permanent naval presence in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, Pakistan’s Gwadar or Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu port.

Should China do this, it would gain exclusive oversight of India’s naval movements in the Indian Ocean region, not least enhancing its regional maritime awareness and operational knowledge.

To guard against this, India appears to have adopted a three-pronged approach: strengthening its naval war-fighting capabilities, cultivating military and diplomatic ties with countries in the Indian Ocean region, notably by establishing overseas maritime watch facilities, and rallying support from like-minded countries via naval exercises and military pacts.

India plans to bolster its anti-surface and submarine warfare capabilities by 2030 with three aircraft carriers, more than 200 navy fighter jets, five nuclear-powered submarines and more P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft. It is also upgrading its military and deterrence capabilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This could help it monitor China’s naval activities in Myanmar’s Coco Islands and beyond.

Satellite pictures of Myanmar’s Great Coco Island show a runway has been extended in recent years and new facilities built. Photo: Google Earth

India has also rolled out a coastal surveillance radar system, setting up radar stations in key littoral states including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles and Myanmar. The establishment of a military base on Mauritius’ Agalega island, reportedly equipped with docking facilities for Indian warships and a runway for P-8I aircraft, could also help it track Chinese submarines.

Such Indian actions and investments will only grow, and should suffice so long as China restricts its activity in the Indian Ocean to the occasional warship deployment.

But India has also forged legal frameworks and operational logistics with strategic partners to show its readiness to take collective military action against China if needed.

India’s exercises, including the Malabar, aim to enhance its military interoperability with Japan, Australia, the US and France. Its military pacts with the US also let it benefit from shared intelligence and access to regional naval logistics.

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And if China escalates its military footprint in the Indian Ocean and presses India in their disputed Himalayan border, India might yet have more ways of stepping on China’s toes.

Signs of a shifting posture are emerging. India is not only eyeing up Southeast Asia as a market for its arms, but has also joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ recent maritime exercise. While the drills were confined to non-disputed South China Sea areas to avoid provoking China, they were reportedly closely watched by the Chinese.

For the first time, India has indicated support for the 2016 Hague ruling that dismissed Beijing’s claims in the contested waters in favour of the Philippines. It also continues to court and work with Asean members to develop its coastal surveillance radar system and information fusion centre network.

Why Asean openly backing rising US presence in region may not upset China

India’s trade routes in the South China Sea, while a secondary area of interest, is gaining prominence in its strategic calculations. Its expanding diplomatic ties and maritime presence in the South Pacific Islands also show its growing readiness to compete against China across the wider Indo-Pacific.

But India’s outreach to Asean and the Pacific Islands is only meant to score diplomatic points and secure economic gains; its naval exercises and patrols mainly enhance its soft power in the Global South. It still lacks the economic and military might to match China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific.

Given India’s inability to claw back territory after its 2020 border clash with China, it is highly unlikely that countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines would lean on India’s military support in their maritime disputes with China. Instead, India is likely to band together with other major powers in the region to increase the collective pressure on China, while avoiding military measures that would invite a blowback.

Asma Khalid is an independent researcher and former visiting fellow at the Stimson Center