How ultranationalists undercut China’s efforts to win world’s love

The spectre of ultranationalism is haunting Chinese social media and getting in the way of countering increasingly negative views of China around the world
Those who welcome a more vocal turn in Chinese online discourse should remember that nationalistic outbursts do not signal strength

Brian Y. S. Wong

Published: 9:30am, 20 Mar 2024

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The novel Red Sorghum is a personal favourite. A paean to the defiant spirits of the Chinese people, it was penned by Guan Moye – also known as Mo Yan – the first Chinese citizen to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012.

Narrating both the triumphs and tribulations of ordinary Chinese people, it tells a captivating story in magical realist tones. Through the lenses of a Shandong family, the reader comes to appreciate five decades of history – from the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s and the founding of modern China in 1949 to the land reforms and anti-rightist purges of the 1950s to the wanton chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

This year, Mo Yan has found himself the target of vociferous internet users who accuse him of being insufficiently patriotic and defaming China to appease Western readers. Joining him in sparking online fury are Nongfu Spring for its ostensibly pro-Japan packaging as well as a Nanjing shopping centre that chose red flowers for festive decorations. The flowers, according to ultranationalist bloggers, resembled the Japanese wartime flag.

The spectre of ultranationalism is haunting Chinese social media. These ultranationalists comprise a fringe yet vocal minority of internet users whose comments are both unequivocally supportive of the Chinese state, and unreservedly vindictive towards those who are not. Targets include liberal Chinese intellectuals and moderates who have maintained cordial relations with the establishment.

Mo Yan served one term in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He is hardly unpatriotic.

Some have suggested that these ultranationalists are the products of the curated propaganda and top-down cultivation by the state apparatus to project China’s discursive power internationally and flex its muscle domestically. However, such speculation ignores other, non-state-related sources of nationalistic pride.

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As scholar Yan Xuetong observed, “postmillennial [Chinese] students usually have a strong sense of superiority and confidence” in response to China’s economic growth and industrial might.

Recent years have also seen the rise of what scholar Zheng Yongnian dubbed “commercial nationalism” – overzealous, jingoistic rhetoric peddled by opportunistic influencers and performative pundits seeking to attract subscribers and grab headlines. Algorithm-fostered echo chambers have amplified the most extreme and trenchant views.

Those who welcome a more vocal turn in Chinese online discourse should remember that nationalistic outbursts do not signal strength. Much like the “Little Englanders” in Britain or MAGA Republicans in the United States, Chinese ultranationalists undermine China’s ability to present itself as a “trustworthy, lovable, and respectable” power. They do this by driving away potential allies and the undecided.

Furthermore, the admonishment of constructive criticism and demonisation of perceived rivals to the country can produce dangerously hubristic groupthink among the Chinese public. Such narratives also vastly undercut the state’s room to manoeuvre in times of conflict. For instance, any attempt to de-escalate and manage tensions over regions including the South China Sea or Sino-Indian border could be framed as unforgivable capitulation.

There are three steps that must be taken to help tell China’s story properly. First, the Chinese state should issue unambiguous, robust guidelines to social media platforms advocating an end to commercial nationalism.

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Chinese policymakers regularly trade off the freedom of speech – and individuals’ right to profit off speech – for other considerations such as public order and national security. The country’s image abroad, the quality of its domestic political discourse and the core interests of those smeared by these online campaigns are important enough to merit prioritising.

Influencers and pundits should not be permitted to profit off scaremongering conspiracies and baseless assertions concerning others’ purported lack of political loyalty or patriotism. Inflammatory speech along such lines must be clearly denounced as contrary to national interest.

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Second, state media outlets should recognise and communicate to the public that the best stories are those that are realistic, balanced and nuanced. Unequivocally positive stories that glorify China are unlikely to move, let alone convince, most of the international audience.

China is a constant work in progress. It is improving yet by no means perfect. We should reflect upon both its achievements and its struggles. Good-faith critics who point to challenges confronting the country – and how the government and people alike have sought to overcome them – should be applauded for their service to the truth and sound governance.

Many bureaucrats are aware of areas with room for improvement, and they crave honest feedback and useful recommendations. Such counsel could be drawn from the experiences of countries beyond its borders or successful regional cases from within. Comparing and contrasting the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping during the early 1980s and those of today could be immensely informative for policy experts and attractive to ordinary citizens.

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen (centre) speaks during a lunch meeting with female economists in Beijing on July 8, 2023. Photo: EPA-EFE

Third, ultra-nationalistic rhetoric can be offset through empowering people who are willing to build bridges and see the world beyond narrowly defined nation-states. When US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited Beijing last summer, she had lunch with a group of six female Chinese economists. These economists were subsequently lambasted for being “traitors”. If anything, the incident betrayed their critics’ deeply seated chauvinism.

At the “two sessions” this year, prominent Peking University academic Jia Qingguo called for the revival of scientific, technological and educational cooperation and exchanges between Chinese and American universities, as well as targeted measures aimed at improving people-to-people exchanges between the two countries.

After all, no story can be told without an audience. To improve its image, China must proactively reach out to audiences across the world – not just in the Global South but also in the Global North. To do so, it must first rein in those who incessantly chant, “China is best!”.

Brian Wong is an assistant professor in philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, and a Rhodes Scholar and adviser on strategy for the Oxford Global Society