While Xi has enhanced the Communist Party’s control of economic matters since he came to power in 2012, by establishing a number of “leading groups” that were later upgraded into commissions to function as supreme decision-making platforms, Ding wrote that there is still room for improvement, as not all departments and local authorities are listening to Beijing wholeheartedly.

Ding wrote that the principle of “two safeguards” – a requirement for the country’s 92 million party members to “firmly safeguard the status of Xi as the core of the Central Committee and of the Communist Party as a whole, and safeguard the authority and the centralised leadership of the party’s Central Committee” – is not always implemented in the economic sphere.

“Some [cadres] think the principle of ‘two safeguards’ is mainly for political issues and has little to do with economic or social works,” Ding wrote. “Some are quick and loud to applaud the Central Committee’s decisions but are hesitant and reluctant to implement them when local interests conflict with overall interests,” while others adhere to the belief that “the higher authorities have policies, but the localities have countermeasures”.

Meanwhile, Ding encouraged local governments, especially grass-roots authorities, to take the initiative in promoting local economic and social development.

“If we want to turn a blueprint into reality, local and grass-roots creativity must be inspired to form a positive interaction between top-level design and the grass-roots experiments,” Ding added.

It is a matter of principle that “doesn’t allow for any confusion nor swerving”, Ding wrote.

Ding reminded the country’s party cadres that they must strictly execute “written and oral instructions made by General Secretary Xi” and “act immediately upon receiving an order, and stop instantly when hearing of a ban”.

The cat-and-mouse game between central and local authorities has been going on in China for thousands of years. As the ancient proverb goes, “the mountains are high, and the emperor is far away”.

In the days of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, one problem in China’s economic management was that decisions made by Beijing were often ignored or skirted by local officials, leading to the expression, “orders don’t go beyond the walls of Zhongnanhai”, referring to the central headquarters for the Communist Party, akin to the White House in the United States.

And even Xi’s leadership has been met with local-level resistance and indifference, according to state media reports.

Ding also wrote that China has developed “a set of sophisticated institutional mechanisms” for the Communist Party to take greater control of the country’s US$15 trillion economy.

At the central level, the regular five-year plans endorsed by the Communist Party, along with the regular meetings of the Politburo, as well as the Politburo Standing Committee, have become routine platforms for the party to make decisions on the economy, Ding wrote.

Meanwhile, special commissions, including the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission and the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission, have become platforms for the party to make decisions on specific subjects or ad hoc events, he added. The latest meeting of the financial commission in September, for instance, discussed a national strategy of upgrading China’s logistics system, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

The decisions made in Beijing could then be implemented through a more efficient command chain across the country, Ding wrote. “The Central Committee and national-level institutions will look after the ‘first mile’, and the local party committees must be responsible for the ‘middle part’, while grass-roots party cells shall complete ‘the last mile’ to ensure … seamless implementation,” he said.

Ding noted that there could be miscommunication or even cheating during the process, and said local cadres “must not resort to fraud or cover-ups, and must not try to deceive top-level authorities”.

While the Communist Party’s firm hold on power, which Beijing describes as “the party’s leadership”, is a hallmark of China’s political and economic system, the party’s increasingly prominent influence in economic and social respects has created new tensions. For instance, China had installed party cells in 68 per cent of its private businesses and 70 per cent of foreign businesses across the country by the end of 2016, and the party’s business penetration has fanned suspicions about Chinese businesses.

Ding did not elaborate on the party’s role in businesses in the article, and he did not address the issue of potential conflicts between the party system and the government system when the party takes over decision-making in overall plans and specific projects.

But Ding hailed the “standardisation” of local Communist Party committees in making important economic decisions over regional development plans, major policies and measures, as well as “important matters related to the national economy and people’s livelihoods”.