US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper seeks to balance relations on visit to Asia-Pacific
- Official has work to do to keep regional allies happy against Donald Trump’s ‘myopic’ foreign policy
- Esper’s next stop is at Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus in Bangkok
Ahead of Esper’s trip, the US Department of Defence published an article emphasising the role of its regional partners.
“America’s network of alliances is its greatest combat advantage, and nowhere is that more important than in the Indo-Pacific region, which Defence Secretary Dr Mark T. Esper has called America’s ’priority theatre’,” the article began.
But looking at the defence secretary’s actions, it’s not clear that the United States fully recognises exactly what it is squandering with President Donald Trump’s myopic and transactional focus on extracting higher payments from treaty allies in particular.
In Seoul, Esper had no choice but to debase himself and speak for his president. Noting that South Korea was a “wealthy country”, he made the argument Seoul “could and should” pay more. That in itself is not controversial, but the current demand – that South Korea increase its contribution for host nation support more than fourfold – is not one made with Seoul’s dignity in mind.
Indeed, before Esper arrived in Seoul, articles and editorials from both traditionally conservative and liberal newspapers had been discussing the right course of action for the country. On both sides of the political spectrum, there is a growing consensus that the US is treating South Korea poorly.
What Esper failed to answer for is what the United States can realistically expect Seoul to do under the current circumstances. South Korean President Moon Jae-in would face political evisceration for acquiescing to extortionate American demands.
Trump perhaps may be looking for nothing more than an excuse to withdraw US troops from the Korean peninsula, something he has hinted at since his presidential campaign in 2015 and 2016. The demands of South Korea are likely being made with an expectation of a convenient “no” from Seoul – one that would provide political cover for a dramatic alteration to the alliance.
On North Korea, Esper has tried to preserve space for diplomacy, even if the prospects of a US-North Korea deal appear more futile than ever in the final weeks of 2019.
“We always have to remain flexible in terms of how we support our diplomats to ensure that we do not close any doors that may allow forward progress on the diplomatic front,” Esper said, suggesting that the US and South Korea could modify an upcoming air forces exercise that has elicited sharp criticism from Pyongyang.
On this count, too, Esper failed – perhaps unsurprisingly given that the US appears unconcerned more generally with the health of its separate alliances with Seoul and Tokyo. (Similar extortionate host nation support demands are being of Tokyo as of Seoul.)
Jeong Kyeong-doo, Esper’s counterpart, said Seoul may reconsider its position if Tokyo reversed course on its punitive export control measures against Seoul, which South Korea sees as retaliation for a court decision last year calling on Japanese companies to pay reparations to South Koreans affected by Imperial Japan’s forced labour practices during the occupation of Korea.
But after all is said and done, the software that undergirds US alliances and partnerships in Asia is deeply malfunctioning. If the US is to retain its historic role and influence in the region, it should hope that what is lost today can be regained tomorrow.