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Two Sessions 2019 (Lianghui)
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Illustration: Lau Ka-kuen

Why is there more dissent inside Beijing’s legislative ‘two sessions’ this year?

  • Some of China’s signature policies are labelled problematic and a waste of money by delegates, while Premier Li Keqiang’s report is questioned
  • Foreign policy a particular focus of debate, although domestic politics is not

Red-faced argument is a sign of good policymaking, at least according to an oft-cited slogan of the Chinese Communist Party.

In reality, however, the public rarely see meaningful policy debate in China. The country’s political elite instead like to keep real discussion behind closed doors and to project a public image of unity.

To many people, Beijing’s annual meetings of its policymaking bodies – rubber-stamp legislature the National People’s Congress (NPC) and advisory body the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – are scripted, boring fare. Most of the time at these bodies’ meetings, or “two sessions”, delegates choose to stick to the official line and avoid saying anything critical to reporters.

A noticeable increase of dissenting voices – although still mild by nature – at this year’s parliamentary sessions is therefore interesting, even though President Xi Jinping faces no real challenge to his power.

Most of these voices are heard in relation to China’s foreign policy, with the country locked in a costly trade war with the United States and facing setbacks in its attempts to spread its influence around the world.

At one of the open discussion panels, Ye Dabo, a former diplomat and now a member of the CPPCC, questioned whether it was accurate for Premier Li Keqiang to say in his government work report that the “Belt and Road Initiative” had made “important progress” last year.

“I think this evaluation may be a bit excessive,” he said at the panel discussion, open to foreign journalists. “We have achieved some results and some fast developments, but it also has problems.”

The initiative, a signature strategy of Xi that aims to expand China’s economic influence throughout Asia and beyond, has been enshrined in the constitution of the Communist Party since 2017. But it suffered some setbacks in 2018. Not only does the US now openly warn other countries to be cautious about involvement in it, but governments from Kuala Lumpur to Islamabad are scaling back their commitment because of debt concerns.

Ye said China’s cooperation with countries through belt and road had “not been as smooth [as they like to see].

“The cooperation with some countries may not be very comprehensive,” he said. “We only have cooperation on a few specific projects. Instead of saying ‘important progress’, I suggest we revise it to ‘cooperation areas have continued to increase’.”

After the premier’s reading of the work report, NPC and CPPCC members are divided into panels to discuss it and air their views. NPC members vote on the final report and budget on the final day, which falls this Friday.

The NPC has never voted to defeat a proposed law, although in 1992 almost a third of its delegates voted against or abstained on the controversial Three Gorges Dam project.

Lou Jiwei called Made in China 2025 a waste of taxpayers’ money. Photo: Simon Song
After another panel session this week, Made in China 2025, Beijing’s industrial blueprint to upgrade its technology sectors, was slammed by Lou Jiwei, the former minister of finance and now a CPPCC member, as “a waste of taxpayers’ money” that involved “a lot of talking but very little was done”.

“There was no need to mention the year 2025 in the first place,” he told the South China Morning Post. “[The government] wants industries to be at the top notch by 2025, but [the trends of] those industries are not predictable and the government should not have thought it had the ability to predict what is not foreseeable.”

Lou added: “I was against it from the start, I did not agree very much with it.”

For the first time in three years, the blueprint was not mentioned in the government’s work report. Some blamed the project for provoking a backlash against China in the US, where President Donald Trump called it “insulting” and has taken measures to contain China’s advance in key tech sectors.

Washington has accused China of using unfair trade and market practices to gain advantages under the Made in China 2025 plan. It demanded Beijing provide better intellectual property protection, ban forced technology transfer, curb industrial subsidies and lift market restrictions for foreign competitors.

Similarly, the Thousand Talents Plan, a high-profile campaign to lure top Chinese talent home from abroad, has been criticised for being “overpromoted” by a political adviser at another open session.

The programme, described by US intelligence officials as “[facilitating] the legal and illicit transfer of US technology, intellectual property and know-how”, is another bone of contention in the US-China trade war. References to it have been toned down by Beijing.

Yuan Jiajun, governor of eastern China’s Zhejiang province, nonetheless told the Post that Made in China 2025 was still being followed there.

Ningbo, a major manufacturing hub in Zhejiang, became the strategy’s first pilot city in 2016, with a focus on smart equipment and self-driving systems. Asked about its progress, Yuan, also a member of the NPC, said: “[We are] still pushing it forward.”

Government initiatives, and the success of them, were not the only themes on which differing views have been aired.

Kong Quan, a former assistant minister of foreign affairs, said trade disputes with the US should not have been given a prominent mention in the work report.

“Everyone pays attention to this and it is a big issue,” said Kong, a member of the CPPCC. “But I personally don’t think promoting Sino-US trade should be an indicator in the government report … why should we put the US in such a noticeable place? I personally think we can even not include it.”

Whereas the government’s past annual reports touched only briefly on foreign policy, the trade war with the US was mentioned three times in this year’s report.

The phrase “the principle of fair competition” – which Washington often uses against China, referring to its subsidising of state-owned enterprises – also appeared in the report for the first time. Li vowed to give equal treatment to private and state-owned enterprises in government bidding.

“[Americans] questioned why China is using the Communist Party to manage the market, and accused us of suppressing the development of private enterprises,” said Zhou Li, a former diplomat to Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, referring to past comments by US Vice-President Mike Pence and National Security Adviser John Bolton.

“I just wonder, do we really need to put this specific phrase in the work report?”

Such surprisingly diverse and sometimes relatively conflicting views from the delegates may suggest greater tolerance of debate.

But Shi Yinhong, an adviser to the State Council, China’s cabinet, said such debates were the result of a lack of clarity from the top.

“The trade talks are still ongoing … on issues like technology innovation, there is a lack of clear instruction from the top decision-makers,” said Shi, an international relations specialist with the Beijing-based Renmin University.

“It could be the decision-makers haven’t made up their minds, or they can’t publicise those decisions because of the ongoing negotiation … so we seem to see more space for public discussion.”

But these discussions would have limited impact on policy direction, Shi added.

“Everyone understands those policies are under adjustment, but it’s not entirely clear what those adjustments should be,” he said. “Such debate will stop once state leaders have made up their minds and sent clear instructions to below.”

“Dissenting” views were at most a cautious expression of discomfort with policies under Xi, said Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute at the University of London.

“The comments are not in any sense organised challenges to government policy,” Tsang said. “We know there’s general unhappiness, so the only surprise was that some of these comments got aired.”

The discomfort would not be strong enough to change Beijing’s policies, he said.

“Should [Xi] show weakness if discomforts were articulated, he would invite further criticism, which he will not allow,” Tsang said.

Zhang Baohui, Chinese politics expert from Lingnan University, said Beijing is traditionally more willing to allow different views on its foreign policies in comparison with domestic politics.

“For example, until very recently, China’s North Korea policy shows a lot of internal differences – some people even called North Korea a troublemaker and said we should abandon it,” he said. “They always have some debate on foreign policy issues.”

Zhang noted that domestic economic policy had even greater latitude for dissenting opinions, but that debate on domestic politics was “totally off-limits”.

“It’s not a surprise to see those … veiled critical views of the two sessions,” he said. “Maybe the government wants it because they want to have some feedback from the informed elites of Chinese society.

“Whether these views matter is a separate issue. They may or may not, because it all depends on whether the suggestions and critiques are truly constructive.”

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