Advertisement
Advertisement
Hong Kong media
Get more with myNEWS
A personalised news feed of stories that matter to you
Learn more
Illustration: Marcelo Duhalde

Dispatches from Hong Kong: the Post’s Wang Xiangwei looks back on 3 decades of reporting on China

  • As he prepares for the next stage in his career, the former editor-in-chief reflects on a country, a city and a newsroom that have undergone major transformations
  • Reporting on China has never been more challenging and Hong Kong remains vital to telling that story, he says
South China Morning Post editorial adviser Wang Xiangwei has spent three decades in journalism covering the remarkable rise of China into a global powerhouse. First as a reporter and later as the Post’s editor-in-chief, he also saw great change within the news organisation. As Wang prepares to start a new chapter in his career, he spoke to executive editor Chow Chung-yan about the major transitions under way in Hong Kong, the Post and China as a whole.

You have spent three decades covering China, witnessing its staggering transformation and impact on global affairs. With China completing its most important leadership reshuffle in years, what do you think is the significance of this for the country and the world?

Back at the Communist Party’s 19th congress in 2017 when Xi Jinping began his second term as party chief, he declared that China had entered a new era under his leadership. It came a year after he had been designated as the “core” of the party’s leadership and five years into an unprecedented anti-corruption drive that tamed not only rampant official corruption but his political rivals.
The campaign rapidly strengthened his power and won him popular support. But his bold declaration of a new era was still premature. Five years ago when he tried to build a new team for his second term, he is believed to have had to consult former leaders including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and take the interests of other party factions into consideration.
His era truly arrived this month at the 20th congress when he unveiled the new leadership line-up for his third term as party chief. He leaves no doubt that he is in absolute control. He has packed the new top leadership team – the Politburo Standing Committee – with his allies. He has shredded the norms and unwritten rules, including the age limits his predecessors introduced to institutionalise and standardise leadership changes.
With Premier Li Keqiang, Wang Yang who used to be the fourth-ranking leader, and Vice-Premier Hu Chunhua out of the new line-up, Xi has also decimated the Communist Youth League faction, Hu Jintao’s power base. The influence of Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction has also declined significantly. Instead of the long-standing practice of promoting Shanghai people from within, Xi has parachuted outsiders in to head China’s most important financial and business hub.

Xi’s supporters argue that from now on there will be no more factions in the party other than Xi’s men. Does that mean the end of factional politics within the party? The jury is still out. As Mao Zedong once said, “a party without factions is all kinds of strange”.

Another sign that Xi values loyalty over norms or diversity is that for the first time in decades there are no women on the 24-member Politburo. More importantly, Xi alone decided the composition of the new team without having to consult the retired leaders as he did five years ago. His repeated emphasis on discipline and confidentiality means that he was able to keep the list of the new team under wraps until the last minute.

Xi ‘personally’ vetted selection of top party team to steer China: Xinhua

All this explains why the new leadership unveiled on October 23 was a big surprise for most close followers of China’s politics. Although younger officials have been promoted, there is no clear successor – Xi apparently sees no need nor is he in a hurry to appoint one. The ease with which he did the manoeuvring makes it certain that he intends to rule the country for at least the next 10 years.

Is this good for China? Xi’s supporters argue that at a time of “changes unseen in a century”, China needs Xi, a strong leader, to take the country forward. But China’s political system is such that once at the top, there are fewer checks and balances. The new structure will no doubt raise more concerns of it being an echo chamber, further reducing checks and balances and making the collective style of leadership a thing of the past.

That said, it must be pointed out that now that Xi has attained total power, in doing so, he has also signed up for unlimited accountability. This is a two-way street. The focus has so far been on his sheer consolidation of power but a much bigger question is how he is going to use that power.

In his speech to the congress, he vowed that he would lead China to become a modern socialist country by 2035 and pave the way for it to become a world power by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic.

Unlike democracies where the people can choose their leaders through the ballot box, the party’s legitimacy of rule comes from the fact it must deliver or risk losing the trust and confidence of the people. Throughout Chinese history, there have been too many examples of disastrous consequences for rulers losing the trust of their people.

The focus has so far been on [Xi’s] sheer consolidation of power but a much bigger question is how he is going to use that power
Wang Xiangwei

For all its remarkable achievements, China is now facing an increasingly complex external environment and a fast-ageing population. Its economic growth is slowing, and doubts about its future are rising. The United States and its allies are increasingly determined to strangle China’s technology sector and reduce the country’s importance in the global supply chain. Do you think China’s rise is still inevitable and can it avoid the “middle-income trap”?

In his keynote speech at the 20th congress, Xi painted an ambitious and rosy picture for the people, saying that the only way to ensure the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and improve people’s lives was through his leadership and the party’s rule.

But a sense of crisis is brewing beneath the optimism of China’s “inevitable” rise.

The latest data shows that China’s economy might have rebounded in the third quarter but its revival over the long term is far from certain. The economy grew just 3 per cent in the first three quarters, putting the government’s target of 5.5 per cent growth for the year out of reach. Pessimism about China’s economic prospects over the next few years is increasing because of draconian Covid-19 restrictions, a collapse in consumer confidence, a private sector under siege, and a slump in the property market.

To make things worse, much of China’s economic pain is self-inflicted. Its “common prosperity” campaign to narrow the income gap and its regulatory crackdowns to correct excesses in the private sector may have been based on good intentions. But the way those measures were implemented really spooked investors at home and abroad.

Meanwhile Xi has stressed the need for self-reliance to prepare for the worst-case scenario and warned that “external attempts” to suppress and contain China might escalate any time soon.

This has led to worries that China is hunkering down for a possible conflict with the West. There were signs of this in Xi’s report to congress in which he referred to “security” far more times than the “economy”. China’s latest leadership changes, a classic example of operating out of a black box, further unnerved investors.

[It] raises questions – which were unthinkable until recently – about whether China is still investible
Wang Xiangwei

All this leads to worries about China’s commitment to reform and opening up, and raises questions – which were unthinkable until recently – about whether China is still investible.

To Beijing’s credit, it has started to take tentative steps to open up to the outside world after nearly three years of Covid restrictions that have basically shut the country off.

And with the congress over, China is preparing to resume some international interaction. From November, a number of heads of state and international organisations, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are expected to visit Beijing.

Xi is expected to travel to Indonesia and meet US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G20 meeting. In addition, from next month, China is likely to further cut quarantine time for overseas visitors from 10 days to seven as Chinese airlines resume more international flights.

Those measures are encouraging but far from enough.

From a communications point of view, China must do a better job of explaining its intentions and policies. A case in point is that at the first press conference to explain the significance of Xi’s report to the congress, five senior Chinese officials responded to questions from the media by apparently reading jargon-filled sections from the report.

A bigger question is now Xi has installed his own trusted team, will he empower them including Li Qiang, premier-in-waiting, to lead in formulating and executing policy?

A related question is about the calibre of Li’s cabinet to be sworn in in March. Ever since Li’s elevation, there has been talk about his credentials and abilities. People who have met him speak highly of his pragmatic and reformist mindset towards foreign investment and the private sector. All in all, Li’s new cabinet must provide much-needed clarity and predictability on policy, matching words with concrete action.

If not, concerns will mount about domestic policies sending China into a middle-income trap and external pressure pushing the country into a “Thucydides Trap”.

What about Hong Kong? You have lived and worked in the city for many years, are a permanent resident and will start the next stage of your career here. Many people are very pessimistic about Hong Kong and are leaving the city. How do you see the future?

As someone who has lived in Hong Kong for nearly 20 years and who proudly calls it home, it pains me to see it going through a very difficult period in the aftermath of the turmoil in 2019, the imposition of the national security law by Beijing as well as the Covid restrictions.

Tens of thousands of people have left the city because of pessimism that Hong Kong’s role will most likely diminish further. But I believe its foundation and unique advantages remain unchanged – even though people tend to not talk about them any more.

There is no political logic for Beijing to turn Hong Kong into another mainland city. Another important reason that Hong Kong’s continued prosperity is assured has to do with the little-said fact that China cannot succeed without Hong Kong. When things are good for China, Beijing needs Hong Kong; when times are bad for China, as they are now, Beijing needs Hong Kong more.

This has been borne out through history, whether it was the early years of the People’s Republic when the city served as the only window onto the Chinese mainland or the 1980s and 1990s when investment through Hong Kong powered China’s economic rise.

Today, as the outside world becomes increasingly uncertain of China’s commitment to reform and opening up, Hong Kong’s role will actually become more critical.

Are strained China-US ties spiralling towards a Thucydides Trap scenario?

Speaking of Hong Kong, you have spent most of your career with the South China Morning Post and led the transformation of the paper from a traditional media outlet to the global digital platform it is today. What were the highlights of that time for you?

I came to Hong Kong in 1993 after a work-study stint in London and joined the Post, where I found my calling, in 1996. In 2000, I took over as the China editor, driving the newspaper’s China-related coverage. In 2012, I became the Post’s editor-in-chief and held the position until the end of 2015 when I moved back to Beijing to be closer to my family, staying on as an editorial adviser.

As a senior editor over the past two decades, I am proud to have led the expansion of our China coverage. China news has always been a core part of the Post’s coverage, but for years, the direction followed the typical Western media perspective. The areas of focus were narrow: Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan and trade. I expanded the coverage scope and decided from the get-go that we needed to have our own unique voice.

The value of the Post is that we cover China from an insider’s perspective. Our understanding of China comes from the fact that we are part of it.

At the same time, we don’t report to Beijing and are not part of the Chinese media system. This allows us to examine the issues at hand critically and independently. I decided that we must have a clear view of our unique positioning.

The other highlight is that I revamped the newsroom and laid the foundation for its transformation into a global digital media outlet. As editor-in-chief, I saw from day one that digitalisation would be the future of the Post.

However, before we started the technology transformation, we had to change the newsroom mindset and structure. I made some mistakes early on because of my lack of experience, but I followed through with my plan and overcame huge resistance to change. Change is never easy, but our persistence paved the way for the Post’s transformation.

For me, one of the most exciting stories I handled came in June 2014 when the Post secured an exclusive interview with Edward Snowden, the former American spy who emerged from hiding in Hong Kong and made explosive allegations about the US government hacking into computers and telecommunication networks in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland.

This may look funny now but back then, that was the first time the Post had flashed teaser paragraphs on social media to drum up interest the day before the publication of our series of Snowden stories. Before that, exclusive stories were kept for print.

That series of stories helped raise the Post’s profile around the world.

The Post is one of the oldest media organisations in Asia and is more than a conveyor of news and analysis – it is an institution whose fate is irrevocably tied with that of the city. The Post’s continued pursuit of excellence in reporting is critical not only to Hong Kong but also to China and the rest of the world.

The free flow of information and news is vital for Hong Kong as a leading financial and business centre in Asia
Wang Xiangwei

Reporting on China has never been more complex and challenging. Since the introduction of the national security law, some say it is no longer viable to report on China from Hong Kong. What do you think? Also, what will be the next chapter in your career?

In my opinion, Hong Kong, as a special administrative region of China but operating beyond the Great Firewall, is and will remain the best vantage point from which to write and report on China, one of the biggest stories of modern times.

It is true that press freedom and free speech in Hong Kong have been under the spotlight following the implementation of the national security law. Beijing and Hong Kong authorities have said the law is designed for crimes that threaten national security, and that reporting can take place, as long as it is accurate. I am pleased to see that the Post, along with other media outlets, have continued to carry prominent stories critical of Beijing without any consequences.

The free flow of information and news is vital for Hong Kong as a leading financial and business centre in Asia. In many ways, China stands to benefit from objective, fair, and balanced media in Hong Kong.

For me, leaving the Post after 26 years is not an easy decision. But I feel it is time for me to move on from the daily hustle of reporting to the next thing that I really want to try – teaching.

Over the past 29 years, I have learned and benefited so much from working for Hong Kong’s media. Now it is time for me to give back and do my bit to keep this beam of light shining.

5