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Pakistani rescuers inspect the scene of a blast on a bus carrying Chinese engineers to the Dasu dam in Kohistan, Pakistan. Photo: EPA

Explainer | Pakistan bus blast: why is anti-China terrorism suspected, who is behind it and what do they want?

  • China’s closeness to Pakistan make its projects a target for Baloch separatists, while its treatment of Uygurs has angered Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
  • Baloch militants have already attacked a Chinese consulate, and the US’ exit from Afghanistan leaves China as the new ‘big villain’ in the TTP’s eyes
Pakistan

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has said that an initial probe into a bus explosion that killed 13 people, including nine Chinese workers, in its northern region on Wednesday suggested the incident was an accident.

China has expressed shock and asked for a full investigation, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi saying that if it was a terrorist attack, the perpetrators should be arrested immediately. Security measures for China-Pakistan cooperation projects should also be strengthened, he said.

Suspicions of terrorism grew on Thursday, when Pakistan’s Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said initial investigations had confirmed traces of explosives and that an attack could not be ruled out.
Despite China’s worries about the safety of its projects and citizens at work sites, analysts say Beijing is not likely to pull back from the US$65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC aims to connect western China to the Gwadar seaport in southern Pakistan as part of Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative to boost global connectivity.
But Pakistan is facing a growing risk of terrorist attacks, as US troops pull out from neighbouring Afghanistan. China’s tightly knit ties with Pakistan, the location of many CPEC projects in restive areas of the country, and its widely criticised policies towards Uygur Muslims in Xinjiang have also made its nationals and projects a target both for the al-Qaeda aligned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and rebels in Balochistan, analysts said.

“There is no shortage of violent actors that oppose Chinese projects and the overall Chinese footprint in Pakistan. Separatist insurgents and Islamist terrorists both view China as being in league with a Pakistani state that they despise,” said Michael Kugelman, senior South Asia associate at the Wilson Centre, a Washington-based think tank.

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Nine Chinese nationals among 13 killed in Pakistan bus blast

Nine Chinese nationals among 13 killed in Pakistan bus blast

Which Chinese interests in Pakistan have been attacked?

To date, most attacks have been conducted by militant Baloch separatists who have been at war with the Pakistan state since 2006. A force comprising some 60,000 Pakistani troops appeared to have crushed the divided Baloch separatists by 2017, but they have since re-emerged and joined forces under the umbrella of the Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (Bras).

It announced itself in November 2018 by launching a suicide squad attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, which was foiled by Pakistani policemen manning security pickets.

Other high profile Bras attacks have included similarly conducted failed assaults on premises with strong Chinese links.

The only luxury hotel in Gwadar, widely used by Chinese nationals working at the port and on CPEC projects, was attacked in May 2019.

Now [the US is leaving Afghanistan] they view China as the new villain and big power
Abdul Basit

In June 2020, gunmen attempted to storm the Karachi Stock Exchange, in which a Chinese consortium acquired a 40 per cent stake in 2016.

The CPEC has “added to the sociopolitical alienation and economic grievances of the local communities who feared being left out in development, deprived of the ownership of their resources and even transformed into a minority in their own province,” said Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.

“The Baloch insurgents view China as a neocolonial power that, in cahoots with the Pakistani military establishment, is undercutting them for their material benefits and strategic interests,” he said.

The TTP, on the other hand, “target China for its harsh treatment of the Uygur Muslim community in Xinjiang province”, Basit said.

The TTP has a long history of alliance with the Turkestan Islamic Party, an extremist Uygur group, and al-Qaeda. Another reason for jihadist attacks on Chinese interests and nationals in this region was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, he said.

“Now they view China as the new villain and big power” in the region, Basit said.

People wheel a gurney towards an ambulance outside a hospital in Dasu, Pakistan, after a bus with Chinese nationals on board plunged into a ravine in Upper Kohistan following a blast. Photo: Reuters

What do the attackers want?

“The attackers want to drive the Chinese out. It’s that simple,” said Wilson Centre analyst Kugelman.

This would be easier said than done though, given that China tended to have a high risk tolerance for navigating unstable environments in Pakistan, he said.

And given how important investment projects in Pakistan are for China’s interests, “Beijing isn’t about to cut and run when its interests and nationals are attacked,” Kugelman said.

Nonetheless, Baloch insurgents and the TTP would continue to target Chinese nationals and interests because it generates instant media headlines, Basit said.

Bus blast: ‘delicate moment’ for China, Pakistan as terrorism fears rise

“By carrying out these attacks, they are also pitching themselves to anti-Chinese forces for funds and financial assistance,” he said.

However, Chinese analysts maintain that the security threat would not deter Chinese investment or the implementation of ongoing projects.

Du Youkang, a former diplomat and international affairs researcher at Fudan University in Shanghai, said that while the casualties from the explosion made it the most serious incident since CPEC construction began it was unlikely to have an overall adverse impact to such a “carefully derived bilateral development strategy”.

“Authorities from both sides are expected to be on high alert over safety and security issues from now on but it will not deter implementation progress of the Dasu hydropower plant, nor the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.”

What are the broader implications of the Dasu blast for the CPEC?

Kugelman said security and financing challenges were the major challenges for the CPEC.

Pakistan experiences “much less terrorism than it used to, but when terrorist attacks do happen, CPEC projects are often a target”, he said.

The Dasu attack underscores the security vulnerabilities of CPEC and risks aggravating an otherwise robust China-Pakistan relationship.

“While Pakistan does its best to provide security for Chinese interests and nationals, they keep getting hit. And Beijing can’t be pleased about that,” Kugelman said.

Why is Islamabad struggling to control the security situation?

Pakistan has faced a renewed wave of terrorist attacks this year, mostly along its lengthy border with Afghanistan.

These have intensified as the Nato forces have vacated military bases near the border and Taliban forces have moved to take their place.

The Taliban seized control of the main border post at Chaman between southern Afghanistan and Balochistan on Wednesday, prompting Pakistani authorities to seal the border.

China urges Pakistan to ‘severely punish’ bus attackers

The TTP, meanwhile, has provided the Taliban with some 5,000 experienced fighters, including seasoned bomb-making experts and brainwashed suicide bombers.

So whereas the Taliban and Pakistan’s security services have been “frenemies” since the 1990s – because Islamabad does not want an India-allied hostile government in Kabul – the Taliban have rarely fought against the TTP, on Islamabad’s request.

Pakistan’s concerns about the security situation in Balochistan, in particular, have grown because the TTP has moved fighters to neighbouring provinces of southern Afghanistan, where Baloch insurgents have safe havens.

The increasing incidence of roadside bomb attacks on Pakistani security forces by Baloch insurgents is seen by the authorities as clear evidence of a transfer of lethal skills from the TTP.

This has rung alarm bells about a wider tactical alliance based on logistical network sharing which would make it easier for both groups of insurgents to re-establish operations in Pakistan’s major cities. Karachi is particularly vulnerable.

Can Pakistan’s military do more to protect Chinese interests?

In practical terms, “there’s only so much the Pakistani security forces can do”, Kugelman said.

“The Pakistani military has the capacity and numbers to guard against attacks, but the militants are clever and know how to adapt,” he said.

To some extent, Pakistan has become a victim of its own successes against the TTP and Baloch insurgents.

The state’s widely embraced narrative that Pakistan has won its war on terror and defeated the terrorists had resulted in a false sense of security, resulting in complacency, said Basit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

“This victory-defeat framework in counterterrorism is misleading,” he said, particularly in countries like Pakistan which is located in a volatile neighbourhood with potential spillover effects, active home-grown terrorism as well as ethnic insurgencies and sectarian feuds.

“The existing counterterrorism framework needs revisions and overhauling” in the context of developments in Afghanistan and resurgent militant attacks in Balochistan and erstwhile TTP strongholds in northwest tribal areas, he added.

To once again defeat the insurgents, Pakistan’s decision-makers needed to set aside their differences and develop a “whole-of-state-and-society approach to fight extremism and terrorism”, Basit said.

Additional reporting by Bloomberg

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