It was the third high-level Indian visit to Bhutan in the past nine months, after external affairs minister S Jaishankar visited in April last year, followed by Indian Army chief General Manoj Pande’s trip in July. The Indian embassy in Bhutan described the discussions as “wide-ranging”, covering “the entire gamut of bilateral relations”, from energy cooperation to trade to their development partnership.

Analysts believe Kwatra’s visit was a sign of India’s growing concerns over the prospects of Bhutan and China moving closer to a resolution of their boundary dispute.

Bhutan holds immense strategic significance for both its neighbours: to its north and northwest is China’s sensitive Tibet region, whereas it is surrounded on all other sides by India’s northeastern region, parts of which are claimed by China. In New Delhi’s strategic circles, Bhutan is a so-called buffer state that separates India and China.

The dispute between Bhutan and China goes back decades; Beijing claims 764 sq km of Bhutanese territory.

So far, Bhutan has remained steadfast in its loyalties towards New Delhi. It has even refused to establish formal diplomatic ties with China.

But the 2021 pact between Bhutan and China, followed by the recent talks, is bound to ruffle feathers in India.

“That New Delhi had concerns (about the talks) was clear from the fact that it dispatched its foreign secretary to Bhutan days after the boundary talks,” said Amit Ranjan, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

“While the press release may not mention it, I am certain that New Delhi would have communicated its concerns on the border talks to Thimphu,” he said.

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, a junior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation think tank, said the talks were “very significant” for Bhutan, with China disputing “nearly 25 per cent” of the country.

“On the looks of it, this is a positive development for Bhutan, which is keen to end the dispute. But it also poses a trust dilemma for Bhutan – as China has been making new claims, despite the 24 rounds of negotiations.”

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Explained: the history of China’s territorial disputes

Explained: the history of China’s territorial disputes

As part of the boundary negotiations, Beijing has in the past offered Thimphu a “swap” of the disputed territories. China promised to relinquish its demands in northern Bhutan if its claims over regions in northwestern Bhutan were recognised.

This is where things get tricky for New Delhi.

“These claims that China has been making in Bhutan’s northwest, they are all around areas that have strategic importance for India,” said Medha Bisht, associate professor in the department of international relations, at the South Asian University in New Delhi, pointing to the northwestern sector’s disputes in four regions and two valleys, including the Doklam region.

The Doklam region is crucial for New Delhi since it lies at the trijunction between China, Bhutan and India. War strategists in New Delhi believe that access to the region would help China mobilise troops and armoury very swiftly in a war scenario with India.

It would also offer the Chinese People’s Liberation Army a very dominant position in trying to restrict India’s access to its northeastern region, by “choking” the Siliguri corridor, a 22km-wide strip of land connecting mainland India to its northeastern region. So crucial is the region that a Chinese plan to construct a road there triggered a 72-day stand-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers in 2017.

Analysts say Bhutan agreeing to such a swap would grievously harm India’s strategic interests.

“China gets an offensive advantage against India if it gets access to the Doklam plateau, one that is especially useful if conflict breaks out between China and India,” Bisht said.

Ranjan said there was growing domestic pressure inside Bhutan on its administration to settle the dispute with China, even if doing so could harm New Delhi’s interests.

“There is a section of the population that believes that there is an immense dependence in Bhutan on India,” he said. “This section wants to resolve the dispute, have stronger ties with China so as to facilitate trade with it,” Ranjan added.

However, Ranjan said Bhutan was unlikely to agree to China’s swap deal, pointing to Bhutan’s dependence on India as a core reason. The landlocked country gets 75 per cent of its imports from its southern neighbour, which is also the destination for 95 per cent of Bhutan’s exports. India also contributes significantly to Bhutan’s development budgets, and acts as the transit point for Bhutan’s trade with other partners.

“Bhutan would never do anything that would harm India’s strategic interests in the region,” Ranjan said.

Thimphu might also be wary of giving in to more Chinese demands, after Beijing in 2020 laid claim to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, which until then had not been a disputed territory.

Adding to the tensions are repeated reports and satellite imagery which show that China has been ramping up construction in areas that Bhutan claims as its own. Last year, reports emerged that China had constructed villages near Doklam, inside the territory it disputes with Bhutan.

Bisht said India had reasons to worry.

“If Bhutan and China come to an agreement, there is little that India will be able to do, except to fortify its own defences.”